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I intend to accomplish three things with my
discussion of this paper. First, I offer a summary of
Jim’s basic line of reasoning, as I understand it, and
then suggest what I believe to be the most important
contributions his paper makes. Second, I use his
paper as ajumping off point to offer my assessment
of a likely shift to privatization in the provision of
one traditionally “public” service in rural
communities, with which I am particularly
interested. Third, I comment briefly on the possible
role of an intermediate institutional arrangement--
public, but with market type incentives--for that
same public service.
Jim begins by offering a positivistic
definition of rural development as a process of
adjustment to Schumpeterian innovations,
particularly as related to the spatial dimension of
economic activity and the degree of remoteness of
rural communities. The adjustment occurs not only
on the part of firms and consumers in the private
sector but also with respect to institutional
arrangements established by governments. He sees
this process as a struggle between rent defenders
and rent seekers with success on the part of the
latter normally requiring effective coalition building
to overcome the entrenched vested interests of the
former in the status quo. He then asks under what
conditions the outcome of this process is likely to
involve privatization of what have traditionally been
publicly provided services in rural areas. His
answer--under conditions where existing provision
of a service is so inefficient that private
entrepreneurs see substantial rents from contracting
with government for its provision, rents sufficient in
magnitude to justify the costs of participation in the
political arena to effect such institutional change.
Such a situation can arise when technological
change creates opportunities for large increases in
productivity and reductions in cost, but when
traditional bureaucracies beyond the discipline of the
market have little incentive to change, and perhaps
in fact strong incentive not to do so. While Jim
concludes that this process of institutional
adjustment involving privatization would appear
likely to move us in the direction of increased
economic efficiency, he recognizes that in any
particular case, privatization may not necessarily do
so, for two reasons: 1) rent seeking can be a zero
or negative sum game, and 2) efficiency gains from
privatization may be more than offset by
inefficiencies introduced as part of the condition
bargain.
Besides the concluding point above, I
believe Jim’s paper makes three other more general
contributions. First, it provides an innovative
attempt to define the concept of rural development
in positivistic terms, by integrating two important
lines of economic thought, one focusing on the
Schumpeterian adjustment process and the second
on rent seeking behavior. Second, he treats
institutional change as endogenous, something
economists often talk about but rarely do. Third, he
challenges us to consider the notion that, as applied
economists, our research and extension efforts will
only be valued by clientele to the extent that we
provide information perceived to be usetid by them
in their roles as rent defenders or rent seekers.
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In my primary area of research interest,
solid waste management, I see a different kind
stimulus motivating institutional adjustment at the
local level. That stimulus is in the form of federal
and state regulations or mandates, which are
changing the economics of landfill disposal, in
particular. Federal Subtitle D requirements for
landfills, which become effective later this year, will
necessitate large capital inputs, both physical and
human, thus generating huge economies of size. As
a result, the economic pressures for a shift to
regional landfills will be enormous, Groups of
counties could, of course, establish a regional
authority or some other institutional entity and
proceed to develop and operate a regional landfill
publicly. However, it seems quite likely tome that
privatization will be a common institutional
adjustment in this movement toward regionalization,
for at least two reasons other than simply the
“incentives to be efficient” argument. First, private
firms would probably face lower transactions costs
associated with organizing de facto regional
arrangements, which would develop in the form of
bilateral agreements between the private firm and
individual communities. Second, private firms may
also possess the willingness and ability to incur the
political wrath associated with securing a landfill
site, wrath that could prove fatal to leaders in the
host community under a public institutional
arrangement. Will privatization lead to increased
efficiency in this kind of regionalization scenario?
I suspect so. How about for other traditionally
“public” services in rural areas? I don’t know, but
it would appear to me a question worth addressing.
There has recently been an upsurge of
interest in the use of market or incentive based
mechanisms in environmental policy--witness the
emissions trading scheme for S02 in the 1990 Clean
Air Act and the “Project 88” studies sponsored by
Senators Heinz and Wirth. This has been occurring
due to growing acceptance by noneconomists in the
regulatory, environmental and business community
of the idea that traditional regulatory or command-
and-control approaches are often very inefficient,
and that market or incentive based mechanisms hold
the promise of achieving a given level of pollution
control at much lower overall cost. Corollary to
this phenomenon has been the increasing application
of user fees in connection with the provision of
what have traditional y been “free” public services
(i.e., supported out of general tax revenues). The
primary impetus for this institutional adjustment has
probably been shrinking real budgets, which have
forced governmental agencies to put services on a
“pay-as-y ou-go,” self-supporting basis or eliminate
some of them altogether. Thus, such changes have
been viewed as “survival techniques” and justified
on equity grounds--with identifiable beneficiaries
paying. As economists, however, we recognize
there are often strong efficiency justifications for
user fees, when rates are set at the marginal cost of
additional units or users. One recent user fee
innovation has been the employment of variable rate
charges for solid waste collection in urban areas,
under which residents are charged differentially for
various size containers or by the bag. Can such
institutional mechanisms be employed in rural areas
to generate revenue for enhanced services and to
provide incentives for source reduction and
recycling? The likelihood that most rural residents
are or will be expected to drop off their garbage at
designated sites makes application of user fees
problematic (due to the perverse incentives likely
created for inappropriate disposal options), but
perhaps there are creative ways to implement user
fees for this and other kinds of services in rural
areas.
And now in closing, let me offer one final
comment. Given the combination of extremely
stressed budgets and demands for enhanced “public”
services facing rural communities today, the
pressure to consider lower cost privatization options,
as well as user fee approaches appears great.
Surely, as applied economists, we have considerable
insight to offer relative to these matters.